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Abstract: Two features of international markets of agri-
cultural commodities are bilateral market power of
exporting and importing countries and the coexistence
of non-genetically modified (non-GM) and genetically
modified (GM) products. The two features were not
taken into account in most extant studies on market
power in international agricultural commodity markets.
This research develops a bilateral oligopoly model with
the interaction between non-GM and GM commodity and
conducts an empirical estimation for U.S.–Japan soybean
trade. The estimation results show that U.S. exporters and
Japanese importers are almost equally sharing the dom-
inance of market power. The analysis in this research
provides new measures of market power and improves
the understanding on world soybean markets.
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Introduction
World agricultural commodity trade flows have changed
dramatically during the last decade. On the production
side, major agricultural commodity producing countries
such as the United States, Brazil, and China started and
expanded the production of genetically modified crops.
On the consumption side, world demand for agricultural
commodities has been increasing significantly, mostly
due to higher incomes in developing countries and
world population growth. An important issue in world
markets of agricultural commodities is market power.
Market power may exist in these markets due to high
market concentration, barriers to entry, product differen-
tiation, or state trading behaviors. The existence and
degree of the market power have important implications
for world agricultural producers, consumers, and
governments.
To examine and measure the degree of market power,
two important features of international markets of agri-
cultural commodities need to be taken into account. One
feature is that, on either side of a market, exporting or
importing, there are usually a few countries that account
for the majority of trade flow.1 Thus, both exporting and
importing countries may have market power to influence
the market price. The second feature is that non-GM and
GM products co-exist in international markets of some
agricultural commodities, such as soybeans. For any
type of agricultural commodity, the non-GM commodity
and the GM commodity are vertically differentiated in the
sense that, if the prices of the two goods are the same, all
consumers will generally prefer the non-GM commodity.
The first feature that both exporting and importing
countries have market power is an example of bilateral
oligopoly (BO). Gabszewicz and Michel (1997) presented a
bilateral oligopoly structure as a special case of a com-
plete multilateral oligopoly structure. A single consump-
tion commodity is traded in a commodity money. Sellers
have endowments of the consumption commodity and
buyers have endowments of the commodity money.
Each agent has market power in the market for which
her initial endowment of the commodity is positive. The
relative price that clears both markets is the ratio of
aggregate offers of two commodities. Bloch and Ghosal
(1997) analyzed the incentives to form trading groups in a
bilateral oligopoly. Only when all agents trade on the
same market, the trading structure is strongly stable.
Dickson and Hartley (2013) found that, when the number
of buyers becomes large, bilateral oligopoly approaches
an alternative game of quantity competition, the market*Corresponding author: Koichi Yamaura, International
Environmental and Agricultural Science, Tokyo University of
Agriculture and Technology, Tokyo, Japan, E-mail:
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1 For example, in the world soybean market, the United States and
Brazil are the major exporting countries and China, European Union,
and Japan are the major importing countries.
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share game. Azzam (1996) is one of the few empirical
studies using a bilateral oligopoly model to analyze mar-
ket power in agricultural and food markets. In the study,
an empirical bilateral oligopoly model was developed to
estimate the relative market power of packers and retai-
lers in the U.S. beef slaughter and retail industries.
Maude-Griffin et al. (2004) conducted an empirical ana-
lysis based on a bilateral oligopoly framework to measure
the market power of health maintenance organizations
and employers in the health insurance market.
The second feature is the coexistence of two differ-
entiated products, non-GM and GM products, in interna-
tional markets of some agricultural commodities. There
are two major approaches for estimating market power in
markets of differentiated products: one is estimating the
residual demand faced by each firm and the other is
estimating a demand system (Perloff et al. 2007). Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) studied the U.S. automobile
industry by using product-level price and quantity data to
estimate demand parameters for a class of differentiated
products. Their estimates were the sum of individual
purchase probabilities, which is equal to the actual mar-
ket share of new cars. Goldberg (1995), however, used
household-level data in the U.S. automobile industry to
examine the probability that a household purchases to
determine the demand curve faced by firms. Nevo (2001)
decomposed estimated price–cost margins into margins
due to product differentiation, multiproduct firm pricing,
and potential price collusion in the ready-to-eat cereal
industry using a mixed logit model. Pinske, Slade, and
Brett (2002) examined the retail gasoline market by using
an alternative approach. The product differentiation was
due to special competition in their study, and a semipara-
metric approach was used to analyze cross-price response
coefficients. Some problems still exist in estimating mar-
ket power and further research is needed. For example,
because of lacking detailed data on costs, researchers
have introduced strong assumptions about cost, e.g.,
constant returns to scale (Perloff et al. 2007).
Numerous studies have estimated the degree of mar-
ket power in international markets of commodities and
other agricultural/food products.2 However, the two fea-
tures of international agricultural commodity markets
were in general not taken into account in the extant
research. First, the potential bilateral market power of
exporting and importing countries was not structurally
modeled in previous studies on international markets of
agricultural commodities.3 Second, the interaction
between two vertically differentiated goods − non-GM
and GM commodity − was ignored in almost all existing
analysis. Yamaura (2014) included the interaction
between non-GM and GM soybeans in the estimation of
market power in U.S.–Japan soybean trade, but the bilat-
eral market power in international soybean markets was
not modeled in his analysis. In sum, no existing study
has taken both features, the bilateral market power of
exporting and importing countries and the interaction
between non-GM and GM commodity, together into con-
sideration to examine market power in international mar-
kets of agricultural commodities.
Failing to include either or both features can result in
incorrect measures of exporters’ or importers’ market
power in international commodity markets and mislead-
ing policy and welfare implications (Mulik and Crespi
2011). This paper addresses this gap in the literature by
explicitly including both bilateral market power of
exporting and importing countries and the interaction
between non-GM and GM commodity in an analysis on
the market power of exporters and importers in interna-
tional soybean markets. We first develop a bilateral oli-
gopoly model to incorporate the interaction between non-
GM and GM commodity in the analysis. Then, we use the
model to conduct an empirical estimation on U.S.–Japan
soybean trade.
Bilateral oligopoly model
Both U.S. exporters and Japanese importers may have
market power to influence the soybean prices in the
U.S.–Japan soybean trade. In addition, both non-GM and
GM soybeans, the two vertically differentiated commod-
ities, are exported from the United States to Japan. Thus,
we develop a bilateral oligopoly model with the inter-
action between non-GM and GM commodity to capture
these two features of the international soybean market.
2 Carter, MacLarean, and Yilmaz (1999), Yang and Lee (2001), Cho,
Jin, and Koo (2002), Reed and Saghaian (2004), Poosiripinyo and
Reed (2005), Song (2006), Andersen, Asche, and Roll (2008), Song
et al. (2009), Felt, Gervais, and Laure (2010), Mulik and Crespi
(2011), and Yamaura (2011) measure the degree of market power in
the trade of agricultural and food products.
3 Andersen, Asche, and Roll (2008) and Song et al. (2009) tried to
use both the residual demand elasticity (RDE) and residual supply
elasticity (RSE) model to measure both exporters’ and importers’
power in the European dried salted cod market and Chinese soybean
trade market. One deficiency of these studies using both RDE and
RSE together is that they did not provide a theoretical foundation
that allows both exporters’ and importers’ market power to interact
in determining the final market equilibrium.
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This model is developed and specified based on the frame-
works in previous research on bilateral oligopoly including
Azzam (1996), Gabszewicz and Michel (1997), Bloch and
Ghosal (1997), Maude-Griffin et al. (2004), and Dickson
and Hartley (2013).
Consider the international soybean market with N
exporters and L importers. The market inverse demand
function is PO ¼ f QO  with f 0<0 , where PO and QO are
the price and the trade volume in international non-GM
soybean market, respectively, and superscript “O”
denotes non-GM commodity. The market inverse supply
function is PO ¼ h QO  with h0 >0 .
We first derive the price in international soybean
market when N exporters have complete dominance
over importers in terms of market power. The profit of
exporter n (n ¼ 1, 2, …, N) is
πexn ¼ ðPO  ζYÞqexn ¼ f QO
  ζY qexn ;
where qexn is the export volume of exporter n, Y is a vector
of supply shifters of exported soybeans, ζ is a vector of
parameters, ζY is the average cost of exported soybeans,
and superscript “ex” denotes exports. Taking the deriva-
tive of πexn with respect to q
ex
n yields exporter n’s the first-
order condition,
@πexn
@qexn
¼ PO þ @f=@QO  @QO=@qexn
 
qexn  ζY ¼ 0;
from which we obtain PO 1þ @f@QO  QOPO 
@QO

@qexn
 
qexn

QO
   ζY ¼ 0 for n ¼ 1, 2, …, N.
Calculating the summation of the conditions of all N
exporters and dividing the summation by N yield
PO 1þ @f@QO  QOPO 
XN
n¼1 @Q
O

@qexn
 
qexn

QO
 .
N
h io
 ζY ¼ 0
) PO 1þ ν="Dð Þ½  ¼ ζY ;
where "D ¼ 1@f=@QOð Þ QO=POð Þ is the demand elasticity of inter-
national soybean market, ν ¼PNn¼1 @QO

@qexn
 
qexn

QO
 .
N is the quantity weighted average of expor-
ter-specific conjectural elasticity. We solve the last con-
dition for PO to obtain the equilibrium price when N
exporters have complete dominance of market power,
Pupper ¼ 1
1þ ν="Dð Þ ζY ¼ ηY ;
where η is defined as η ¼ 11þ ν="Dð Þ ζ and it is a vector of
parameters to be estimated, and superscript “upper” indi-
cates that Pupper is the upper limit of price in the interna-
tional soybean market.
Then we derive the price in international soybean
market when L importers have complete dominance
over exporters in terms of market power. The profit of
importer l (l ¼ 1, 2, …, L) is
πiml ¼ POr  PO
 
qiml  COr qiml
 
¼ POr  h QO
  
qiml  COr qiml
  ;
where qiml is the import volume of importer l, P
O
r is the
retail/wholesale price that importer l can receive from
selling the imported soybeans in its own country’s mar-
ket, COr q
im
l
 
is the importer’s selling cost of soybeans,
superscript “im” denotes imports, and subscript “r”
denotes retail/wholesale. Taking the derivative of πiml
with respect to qiml yields importer l’s the first-order
condition,
@πiml
@qiml
¼ POr  PO  @h

@QO
 
@QO

@qiml
 
qiml MCOr ¼ 0;
where MCOr ¼ @COr

@qiml is the importer’s marginal selling
cost of imported soybeans. From the first-order condition,
we find POr  PO 1þ @h

@QO
 
QO

PO
 
@QO

@qiml
 
qiml

QO
  MCOr ¼ 0 for l ¼ 1, 2, …, L. Taking the sum-
mation of the conditions of all L importers and dividing
the summation by L yield
POr  PO 1þ @h

@QO
 
QO

PO
 
XL
l¼1 @Q
O

@qiml
 
qiml

QO
 .
L
h io
MCOr ¼ 0
) PO 1þ μ="Sð Þ½  ¼ POr MCOr ;
where "S ¼ 1@h=@QOð Þ QO=POð Þ is the supply elasticity of inter-
national soybean market, μ ¼PLl¼1 @QO

@qiml
 
qiml

QO
 .
L is the quantity weighted average of impor-
ter-specific conjectural elasticity. We solve the last con-
dition for PO to find the equilibrium price when L
importers have complete dominance of market power,
Plower ¼ 1
1þ μ="Sð ÞZ ¼ λZ;
where Z ¼ POr MCOr is a vector of demand shifters of
imported soybeans, λ is defined as λ ¼ 11þ μ="Sð Þ and it is a
vector of parameters to be estimated, and superscript
“lower” indicates that Plower is the lower limit of price in
the international soybean market.
In a more common bilateral oligopoly market, neither
importers nor exporters have complete dominance. Both
importers and exporters have some degree of influence
on the market price. If the relative dominance of impor-
ters over exporters in terms of market power is denoted as
α, the market equilibrium price of bilateral oligopoly can
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be specified as a weighted average of the lower and
upper price limit,
PO ¼ α Plower þ 1 αð ÞPupper ¼ α λZð Þ þ 1 αð Þ ηYð Þ:
½1
For the relative dominance in terms of market power,
Azzam (1996) used a single parameter α 2 0; 1½  to repre-
sent the degree of dominance of downstream firms (beef
retailers) and 1 α to represent the degree of dominance
of upstream firms (beef packers). Then the parameter α
was estimated and the estimates, α^ and 1 α^ , are used to
interpret the relative dominance of retailers and packers.
Maude-Griffin et al. (2004) used a function of various
factors, γit ¼ exp Z0itθð Þ , to represent the degree of dom-
inance of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in
terms of market power and 1 γit to represent the degree
of dominance of employers in the health insurance mar-
ket, where Zit is a vector of variables affecting the HMOs’
and employers’ relative dominance such as the local
HMO market structure and the administrative cost ratio
of HMOs. θ is a vector of parameter to be estimated. γit
and 1 γit are calculated using the estimates of θ and the
variable values of Zit to measure the relative dominance
of HMOs and employers.
We derive and use a function of various factors (see
Appendix for the derivation),
α ¼ g WN ; RL;PGM;JP;PGM;US 
¼ 1
1þ exp δ1 þ δ2PGM;JP þ δ3PGM;US þ fWN þ τRL
  ;
½2
to represent the degree of dominance of importers and
1 α to represent the degree of dominance of exporters,
where WN is a vector of the cost shifters for competing
soybean exporting countries, RL is a vector of the cost
shifters for competing soybean importing countries,
PGM;JP and PGM;US are the prices of the vertically differen-
tiated substitute, GM soybeans, in Japan and the United
States, and δ1, δ2, δ3, f, τ are parameters or vectors of
parameters to be estimated. The functional form in eq. [2]
can guarantee α 2 0; 1½  but impose no sign constraints on
parameters. α ¼ 0 indicates the complete dominance of
exporters and α ¼ 1 indicates the complete dominance of
importers. When α1 <0:5 (α1 >0:5), importers have less
(more) market power than exporters. When importers
completely dominate exporters, the equilibrium interna-
tional soybean price reaches the lower limit of possible
price levels. However, if exporters completely dominate
importers, the equilibrium international soybean price is
the upper limit of possible price levels. The equilibrium
soybean price of a bilateral oligopoly market is the
weighted average of the lower and upper price limit and
the weights are the degrees of dominance of importers and
exporters in terms of market power.
We substitute eq. [2] into eq. [1] to obtain the empiri-
cal bilateral oligopoly model with the interaction between
non-GM and GM soybeans as
POUS;JP ¼
1
1þ exp δ1 þ δ2PGM;JP þ δ3PGM;US þ fWN þ τRL
  λZð Þ
þ exp δ1 þ δ2P
GM;JP þ δ3PGM;US þ fWN þ τRL
 
1þ exp δ1 þ δ2PGM;JP þ δ3PGM;US þ fWN þ τRL
  ηYð Þ þ u
ðModel with InteractionÞ
;
½3
where WN is a vector of the cost shifters for competing
soybean exporting countries consisting of the exchange
rates between Japan and competing exporting countries
such as Canada and China, RL is a vector of the cost
shifters for competing soybean importing countries con-
sisting of the exchange rates between the United States
and competing importing countries such as the EU,
China, and South Korea, Z is a vector of demand shifters
of the Japanese market consisting of Japanese average
income, Y is a vector of supply shifters in the United
States including labor cost, energy cost, and the soy-
bean-corn futures price ratio, δ1, δ2, δ3, f, τ, λ, and η
are parameters or vectors of parameters, and u is the error
term.
For comparison, we also estimate the empirical BO
model when the interaction between non-GM and GM
soybeans is ignored. Without the interaction term, the
relative dominance of importers over exporters changes to
~α ¼ 1
1þ exp δ1 þ fWN þ τRL
  : ½4
So the empirical bilateral oligopoly model without the
interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans is speci-
fied as
POUS;JP ¼
1
1þ exp δ1 þ fWN þ τRL
  λZð Þ
þ exp δ1 þ fW
N þ τRL 
1þ exp δ1 þ fWN þ τRL
  ηYð Þ þ u
ðModel without InteractionÞ:
½5
Equations [3] and [5] specify two versions of the empirical
BO model for U.S.–Japan soybean trade. POUS;JP is the
equilibrium price of non-GM soybeans that Japan
imports from the United States. In the estimation, the
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data of Japanese non-GM soybean import price is used
for POUS;JP.
4
The parameters of interest are α, ~α, δ2, and δ3.
The values of α and ~α measure the relative degrees of
dominance of Japanese importers vs. U.S. exporters in
terms of market power in two versions of the empirical
BO model. The magnitudes of α and ~α can help us under-
stand the nature of competition in U.S.–Japan soybean
trade and provide useful insights for industry partici-
pants, researchers, and policy makers. The estimates of
δ2 and δ3 can show whether the interaction between two
vertically differentiated products (non-GM and GM soy-
beans) should be included in the estimation of the
degrees of market power of soybean importers and
exporters.
Data
Weekly data from January 2000 to December 2011 are used
in the estimation. The weekly export price data for U.S. GM
soybeans were obtained from Chicago Board of Trade
(CBOT). The weekly price and quantity of Japanese non-
GM soybean imports and the weekly price of Japanese GM
soybean imports from the United States were obtained from
Tokyo Grain Exchange. Through contacting representatives
of Cargill5 and Huron Commodities, Inc.,6 we obtain the
data of non-GM soybean premiums paid to U.S. farmers
and know that the non-GM soybean premiums are greatly
affected by its demand. Thus, we calculate U.S. non-GM
soybean prices as the sum of U.S. GM soybean prices from
CBOT and the (high-protein) non-GM soybean premiums.
Since Japanese soybean wholesalers7 import non-GM soy-
beans to make food products such as tofu, miso, and natto
(Japan Tofu Association 2014, Japan Natto Cooperative
Society Federation 2014, Miso Online 2014), we use the
high protein non-GM soybean premium price to calculate
U.S. non-GM soybean prices.8
We use real export and import prices in the estima-
tion. U.S. non-GM and GM soybean export prices are
transformed to the real terms by using the consumer
price index (CPI) in Japan. Data on the monthly CPI in
Japan were obtained from the portal site of Official
Statistics of Japan, e-Stat. Japanese non-GM and GM
soybean import prices are converted into real terms by
using the producer price index (PPI) in the United
States. The data on the monthly PPI in the United
States were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics.9
Japanese personal disposable income (PDI) is used as
the destination market demand shifters.10 Data on the
monthly PDI were obtained from e-Stat. The PDI data
are converted into real terms by using the CPI in Japan.
Weekly exchange rates between Japan and competing
exporting countries including Canada and China were
obtained from PACIFIC Exchange Rate Service, the
University of British Columbia. These exchange rates are
4 The data of Japanese non-GM soybean import price instead of U.S.
non-GM soybean export price is used for POUS;JP in the estimation of
BO model because the data of Japanese non-GM soybean import
price is obtained directly from a single source (Tokyo Grain
Exchange) while the data of U.S. non-GM export price is obtained
indirectly using the sum of U.S. GM soybean price from CBOT and
the (high-protein) non-GM soybean premiums from Cargill and
Huron Commodities, Inc. So Japanese import price may be a more
accurate representation of the equilibrium price (POUS;JP) of non-GM
soybeans that Japan imports from the United States. When U.S. non-
GM soybean export price is used for POUS;JP in the estimation, the
estimation results show that the signs remain the same and the
magnitudes and significance levels are similar for most coefficient
estimates.
5 Mr. Jeff Duckworth, Cargill, Bloomington, IL. http://www.cargil
lag.com.
6 Mr. Jim Traub, Huron Commodities USA, Monticello, IL. http://
www.huron.com/.
7 Major soybean wholesalers are Marubeni Corporation http://www.
marubeni.com/index.html, Mitsui & CO., LTD. http://www.mitsui.
com/jp/en/index.html, and Sojitz Corporation http://www.sojitz.
com/en/index.html.
8 Because the GM soybean price from the CBOT is quoted in cents
per bushel and the non-GM soybean premiums are quoted in dollars
per bushel, we use Metric Conversions (1 Metric Ton ¼ 36.7437
bushels for soybeans) from the Ag Decision Maker at Iowa State
University to convert the data from dollar per bushel to dollar per
metric ton.
9 The rationale of using real values instead of nominal values in the
empirical estimation is that Japan experienced long-time deflation
during the time period (2000–2011) of the study. This long-time
deflation is unusual compared with the common slight inflation in
many other economies. We are concerned that using the nominal
values from a long period of deflation in the estimation may distort
some coefficient estimates. For comparison, we also estimate the
models with the nominal values. When nominal values are used in
the BO model estimation, the signs are the same and the magnitudes
and significance levels are similar for most coefficient estimates,
compared with the results using real values.
10 Mulik and Crespi (2011) used destination countries’ wage index,
wholesale price index, or producer price index (PPI) as the cost
shifters in an RDE model for Indian and Pakistan Basmati rice
exports analysis.
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expressed as the number of competing exporting coun-
tries’ currencies per Japanese yen.11
Cho et al. (2002) emphasized the importance of using
real exchange rates, while most previous studies used
nominal exchange rates in the estimation of RDE and
RSE models. In this study, we use real exchange rates,
which are obtained by multiplying nominal exchange
rates with the ratios of price levels in the two correspond-
ing countries (Krugman and Obstfeld 2002).12
We use labor cost and energy cost as the producers’
supply shifters. Data on the monthly labor cost were
obtained from the OECD iLibrary, and a monthly com-
modity fuel index was obtained from the International
Monetary Fund as the energy cost. The labor cost and
energy cost data are converted to the real terms by using
the PPI in the United States. We also use the soybean-
corn futures price ratio (SCR) that is synthetically gener-
ated using soybean and corn futures prices. The SCR is
not a tradable futures contract and is being distributed
for information purposes only (CME Group).13 Data on the
SCR were obtained from CBOT. The EU, China, and South
Korea are other importing countries of U.S. non-GM
soybeans. Weekly exchange rates between the United
States and the other destination countries including the
EU, China, and South Korea were obtained from the
PACIFIC-ERS. These exchange rates are expressed as the
number of other destination countries’ currency per U.S.
dollar. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of quantity,
real prices for U.S. non-GM and GM soybean exports and
Japanese non-GM and GM soybean imports, demand shif-
ters, supply shifters, and cost shifters.
Estimation results
We use nonlinear least squares (NLS) method for the
estimation of the empirical BO model based on Azzam
(1996) and Maude-Griffin, Feldman, and Wholey (2004).
In the estimation, we address the autocorrelation issue.
The heteroskedastic-consistent (White robust) standard
errors are used and reported. We initially included energy
costs of the competitors in the estimation, but these vari-
ables were eventually dropped from the model based on
the significance levels of coefficient estimates and Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC). In addition, to check the
potential multi-collinearity among exchange rate vari-
ables, we used Collin command in STATA to obtain the
tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF) for each
exchange rate variable in all empirical models. All toler-
ance values are much larger than 0.10 and all VIF’s are
smaller than 10 so that these values suggest that multi-
collinearity is not a severe concern for the empirical
models.
Table 1: Summary statistics of Non-GM soybean analysis.
Variable Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
PUS (JPY/MT) 34,250.94 10,666.21 18,231.49 68,968.43
PJP (USD/MT) 305.6081 72.145 193.5037 534.8425
PGM;US (JPY/MT) 29,959.54 9,094.863 17,062.81 62,324.99
PGM;JP (USD/MT) 268.2251 52.66697 179.6687 423.5965
QnonGM (MT) 17.07659 4.886468 5.851398 33.45151
ERJP;CA (CAD/JPY) 0.011653 0.001429 0.008209 0.014318
ERJP;CH (CHY/JPY) 0.072154 0.005594 0.061614 0.083787
ERUS;EU (EUR/USD) 0.847115 0.153871 0.629723 1.199544
ERUS;CH (CHY/USD) 7.681722 0.693274 6.310741 8.280202
ERUS;KO (KOW/USD) 1,129.104 127.1173 906.38 1558.1
IncomeJP (JPY) 10,390.1 434.0878 9,560.059 11,228.95
SCRUS 2.470471 0.377396 1.719088 3.978125
LCUS 81.2971 12.4855 95.4444 102.4624
ECUS 129.2759 26.7644 94.3 192.6
TimeTrend 313 180.5662 1 625
11 For instance, the exchange rate between Japan and Canada on
December 30, 2011, is 0.013157 Canadian dollars per Japanese yen.
12 The real exchange rate measures the purchasing power of a
currency relative to another, which is known as purchasing power
parity (PPP).
13 The November soybean futures over December corn futures is a
key index for the present U.S. soybean farmers to help them decide
whether they will continue planting soybeans or shift to corn during
the next year.
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The model with interaction
The estimation results of the empirical BO model with the
interaction of non-GM and GM soybeans are reported in
Table 2. The degrees of dominance (α and 1 α) of
Japanese importers and U.S. exporters in terms of market
power are calculated using the formulae in eq. [2] and
their coefficient estimates.14 The average values of α and
1 α are 0.415 and 0.585, respectively. These results
show that U.S. exporters and Japanese importers have
almost equal market power in international soybean mar-
kets with a slight U.S. dominance. It is usually believed
that U.S. soybean exporters may have strong market
power while Japanese importers have little influence on
price due to the significant share of U.S. soybeans in
Japanese import market.15 The estimation results in this
study show that taking the two features, bilateral market
power and the interaction between non-GM and GM com-
modity, into account can provide a new measure, the
relative dominance in terms of market power of importers
and exporters, to examine the market competition in
international markets of agricultural commodities.
The coefficient estimates (δ^2 and δ^3) of the Japanese
and U.S. GM soybean price are significant at the 1% and
10% level, respectively.16 These results indicate that the
model with the interaction between non-GM and GM
soybeans is preferred.
The model without interaction
For comparison, we also estimated the empirical BO
model without the interaction between non-GM and GM
soybeans and its results are included in Table 2. The
model’s coefficient estimates and the formulae in eq. [4]
are used to calculate the degrees of dominance (~α and
1 ~α) of Japanese importers and U.S. exporters in terms
of market power. The average values of ~α and 1 ~α are
0.359 and 0.641, respectively. These values indicate that
U.S. exporters have significantly more market power than
Japanese importers in international soybean market. The
comparison of these values with the estimates of α and
Table 2: Estimation results of the Bilateral Oligopoly (BO) models.
Model without Interaction Model with Interaction
PGM;JP −0.0054***
(0.0010)
PGM;US −0.0001*
(0.00003)
ERJP;CA 148.629 −24.1688
(127.7) (29.4213)
ERJP;CH −21.324 −2.3763
(25.939) (6.0550)
ERUS; EU −0.0010 −0.0004*
(0.0011) (0.0002)
ERUS;CH 2.3654 0.6320***
(2.1773) (0.2286)
ERUS;KO 1.5301*** 0.2673***
(0.5294) (0.0855)
IncomeJP 0.0141 0.0206**
(0.0117) (0.0085)
SCRUS 2270.65** −861.879
(1021.7) (1050)
ECUS 68.277 329.058***
(171) (122.4)
LCUS 162.138*** −10.938
(62.0611) (68.4916)
Constant −12.0656** 0.2729
(4.7155) (0.8184)
Adjusted R2 0.9408 0.9613
DW 2.1524 2.0409
Note: *, **, and *** indicate coefficient estimates are statistically
significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
The values in the parenthesis are heteroskedastic consistent standard
errors.
14 The formulae, α ¼ 1 1þ exp 0:27 0:005PGM;JP  0:0001
PGM;US  24:17ERJP;CA  2:38ERJP;CH  0:0004ERUS;EU þ 0:63ERUS;CH
þ0:26ERUS;KOÞ, and the mean values of variables are used in the
calculation. Six of the eight coefficient estimates used in the calcu-
lation are statistically significant while two are insignificant. Using
only the significant estimates in the calculation does not lead to
much change in the calculated average values of α and 1 α . When
all coefficient estimates are used, the average values of α and 1 α
are 0.415 and 0.585, respectively. When only significant coefficient
estimates are used, the average values of α and 1 α are 0.414 and
0.586, respectively.
15 Using estimates of residual demand and supply elasticities,
Yamaura (2011) found that U.S. non-GM soybean exporters’ market
margin is 22% and Japanese importers’ market margin is only 4%.
Nakajima (2013) showed that U.S. exporters’ market margin is 10.1%
in U.S.–Japan soybean trade.
16 The signs of δ^2 and δ^3 depend on several factors including the
interaction/coordination between U.S. exporters’ selling strategy for
non-GM soybeans and that for GM soybeans, and the substitutability
(or complementary) between non-GM and GM soybeans for the
demand by Japanese importers and consumers. U.S. exporters’ sell-
ing strategies for two vertically differentiated products, non-GM and
GM soybeans, can result in either a positive or negative relationship
between the prices of the two products, depending on the quality
and cost difference between the two products, the distribution of
consumer preferences, etc. The substitutability (complementary)
between two products in consumption can lead to a positive (nega-
tive) relationship between the two prices. The signs of δ^2 and δ^3 will
depend on the nature and relative magnitudes of these effects.
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1 α in the model with the interaction shows that failing
to include the interaction between non-GM and GM soy-
beans leads to overestimated U.S. non-GM soybean
exporters’ market power and underestimated Japanese
importers’ market power.
Conclusions
In this research, a bilateral oligopoly (BO) model is devel-
oped and the corresponding empirical estimation is con-
ducted for U.S.–Japan soybean trade. The interaction
between non-GM and GM soybeans is included in the
BO model. Thus, this study takes two features, bilateral
market power of exporters and importers and the coex-
istence of non-GM and GM commodity, of U.S.–Japan
soybean trade into account to improve the measurements
of market power of U.S. exporters and Japanese
importers.
The estimation results show that U.S. exporters and
Japanese importers are almost equally sharing the market
power with a slight U.S. dominance. Taking the two
features, bilateral market power and the interaction
between non-GM and GM commodity, into account pro-
vides a new measure, the relative dominance of U.S.
exporters and Japanese importers in terms of market
power, to evaluate the market competition in U.S.–
Japan soybean trade. The statistical significances of the
coefficient estimates of the interaction terms, Japanese
and U.S. GM soybean price, suggest that the inclusion
of the interaction between non-GM and GM soybeans is
necessary and preferred.
This research can be useful for industry participants
in international soybean markets, academic researchers,
and policy makers. With the decreasing non-GM soybean
production in the United States, Japanese non-GM soy-
bean importers have to pay higher premiums for U.S.
non-GM soybeans. Given the significant share of U.S.
soybeans in the Japanese import market, it is usually
believed that U.S. non-GM soybean exporters could influ-
ence the market price while Japanese non-GM soybean
importers were just price takers. However, our results
indicate that U.S. exporters and Japanese importers are
almost equally sharing the dominance in terms of market
power in U.S.–Japan soybean trade.
Since the beginning of this century, other large agri-
cultural exporting countries such as Brazil and Argentina
have become increasingly stronger competitors to the
United States in international markets of agricultural
commodities (Yang and Lee 2001; Poosiripinyo and
Reed 2005; Song et al. 2009; Felt et al. 2010). Better
policies based on new and improved research are needed
to assist agricultural producers and exporters in the
United States. Our new estimation results for interna-
tional soybean markets can be helpful to policy makers
in the United States, Japan, and other major agricultural
exporting and importing countries. Our results of almost
equally shared market power between U.S. exporters and
Japanese importers, and the effect of the interaction
between non-GM and GM soybeans can be used by policy
makers in the design and implementation of policies for
the soybean industry. Given that U.S. exporters and
Japanese importers share the market power, Japanese
policy makers know that the import price their importers
pay is not too much higher than the competitive level so
that they can adjust their policies and support for domes-
tic soybean producers and consumers accordingly. U.S.
soybean exporters do not have much market power as
usually expected in U.S.–Japan trade. So U.S. policy
makers may reconsider the support level for U.S. soy-
bean producers and exporters. The effect of the interac-
tion between non-GM and GM soybeans in market
competition can cause policy makers to make further
efforts to coordinate their policies for the industries and
markets of non-GM and GM commodities. In addition,
the empirical models and estimation results can provide
some references for academic researchers analyzing
competition issues in international agricultural com-
modity markets with bilateral market power and differ-
entiated products.
Appendix: Derivation of the degree
of dominance (α and 1 α) of
importers and exporters in terms of
market power
The degrees (α and 1 α) of dominance of importers and
exporters depend on the factors that affect the relative
market power of importers and exporters. For importers,
the cost shifters for competing soybean importing coun-
tries can influence their market power in international
markets. The market power of exporters will be affected
by the cost shifters for competing soybean exporting
countries. In addition, the prices of the vertically differ-
entiated substitute, GM soybeans, will impact the relative
market power of importers and exporters. Thus, we spe-
cify the degrees (α and 1 α) of dominance of importers
and exporters as functions of these factors,
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α ¼ g WN ; RL;PGM;JP;PGM;US  and
1 α ¼ 1 g WN ; RL;PGM;JP;PGM;US 
where WN is a vector of the cost shifters for competing
soybean exporting countries, RL is a vector of the cost
shifters for competing soybean importing countries,
PGM;JP and PGM;US are the prices of the vertically differ-
entiated substitute, GM soybeans, in Japan and the
United States.
In addition, the functional forms used for α and 1 α
need to guarantee α 2 0; 1½  but impose no sign con-
straints on parameters so that we can allow the flexibility
for data to find the sign, magnitude, and significance of
the effect of each factor. The functional form, 11þexp γXð Þ ,
can keep its value in the range of 0; 1½  and do not
impose sign constraints on the coefficient ( γ ) of its argu-
ment (X ), so that we set the degree of dominance as
α ¼ g WN ; RL;PGM;JP;PGM;US 
¼ 1
1þ exp Φ WN ; RL;PGM;JP;PGM;US   and
½6
1 α ¼ 1 g WN ; RL;PGM;JP;PGM;US 
¼ exp Φ W
N ; RL;PGM;JP;PGM;US
  
1þ exp Φ WN ; RL;PGM;JP;PGM;US   :
½7
Then we use a linear functional form for Φ WN ;

RL;PGM;JP;PGM;USÞ in order to avoid too complicated
final empirical specification for the econometric model.
So we have
Φ WN ; RL;PGM;JP;PGM;US
  ¼ δ1 þ δ2PGM;JP
þ δ3PGM;US þ fWN þ τRL;
½8
where δ1, δ2, δ3, f, τ are parameters or vectors of para-
meters to be estimated. We substitute [8] into [6] and [7]
to obtain the specifications for the degrees of dominance
of importers and exporters,
α ¼ g WN ; RL;PGM;JP;PGM;US 
¼ 1
1þ exp δ1 þ δ2PGM;JP þ δ3PGM;US þ fWN þ τRL
  and
½9
1 α ¼ 1 g WN ; RL;PGM;JP;PGM;US 
¼ exp δ1 þ δ2P
GM;JP þ δ3PGM;US þ fWN þ τRL
 
1þ exp δ1 þ δ2PGM;JP þ δ3PGM;US þ fWN þ τRL
  :
½10
The function forms in [9] and [10] can guarantee
α 2 0; 1½  but impose no sign constraints on parameters.
References
Andersen, T. B., F. Asche, and K. H. Roll. 2008. “Oligopoly and
Oligopsony Power in Concentrated Supply Chains.” ISIAC
Working Paper 08–1. University of Rhode Island.
Azzam, A. M. 1996. “Estimating the Degree of Dominance in a
Bilateral Oligopoly.” Applied Economics Letters 3:209–11.
Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes. 1995. “Automobile Prices in
Market Equilibrium.” Econometrica 63:841–90.
Bloch, F., and S. Ghosal. 1997. “Stable Trading Structures in
Bilateral Oligopolies.” Journal of Economics Theory 74:
368–84.
Carter, C. A., D. MacLarean, and A. Yilmaz. 1999. “How Competitive
is the World Wheat Market.” Working Paper No. 99–002,
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University
of California, Davis.
Cho, G., H. J. Jin, and W. W. Koo. 2002. “Measuring the Market
Power of the U.S. Wheat Exporters in Asian countries: An Issue
about Adjustment of Nominal Exchange Rate When Using as A
Cost Shifter.” Paper presented at the American Agricultural
Economics Association conference, Long Beach, CA,
28–31 July.
Dickson, A., and R. Hartley. 2013. “Bilateral Oligopoly and Quantity
Competition.” Economic Theory 52:979–1004.
Felt, M. H., J. P. Gervais, and B. Laure. 2010. “Market Power and
Import Bans: The Case of Japanese Pork Imports.” Agribusiness
26:1–18.
Gabszewicz, J. J., and P. Michel. 1997. “Oligopoly Equilibrium in
Exchange Economies.” In Trade, Technology and Economics:
Essays in Honor of Richard G. Lipsey, edited by Easton, B. C.
and R. G. Harris,217–40. Cheltenham: Elgar.
Goldberg, P. K. 1995. “Product Differentiation and Oligopoly in
International Markets: The Case of the U.S. Automobile
Industry.” Econometrica 63:891–951.
Japan Natto Cooperative Society Federation. 2014. Available at:
http://www.710.or.jp/english/index.html
Japan Tofu Association. 2014. Available at: http://www.tofu-as.jp/
english/index.html
Krugman, P., and M. Obstfeld. 2002. International Economics:
Theory and Policy, 6th. ed. Boston, MA: Addison Wesley.
Maude-Griffin, R., R. Feldman, and D. Wholey. 2004. “Nash
Bargaining Model of HMO Premiums.” Applied Economics
36:1329–36.
Miso Online 2014. Available at: http://www.miso.or.jp/ (in
Japanese).
Mulik, K., and J. M. Crespi. 2011. “Geographical Indications and the
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS): A
Case Study of Basmati Rice Exports.” Journal of Agricultural &
Food Industrial Organization 9(4):1–19.
Nakajima, T. 2013. “Price Transmission and Market Power in the
International Vegetable Oil Markets.” PhD dissertation,
University of Tokyo.
Nevo, A. 2001. “Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal
Industry.” Econometrica 69:307–42.
Perloff, J. M., L. S. Karp, and A. Golan. 2007. Estimating Market
Power and Strategies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pinske, J., M. E. Slade, and C. Brett. 2002. “Spatial Price
Competition: A Semiparametric Approach.” Econometrica
70:1111–53.
K. Yamaura and T. Xia: Measuring Bilateral Market Power in International Markets 41
Brought to you by | Kansas State University Libraries
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/4/17 12:20 AM
Poosiripinyo, R., and M. Reed. 2005. “Measuring Market Power in
the Japanese Chicken Meat Market.” Journal of International
Agricultural Trade and Development 1:135–48.
Reed, M. R., and H. S. Saghaian. 2004. “Measuring the Intensity of
Competition in the Japanese Beef Market.” Journal of
Agricultural and Applied Economics 34(1):113–21.
Song, B. 2006. “Market Power and Competitive Analysis of China’s
Soybean Import Market.” PhD dissertation, University of
Kentucky.
Song, B., M. A. Marchant, M. R. Reed, and S. Xu. 2009. “Competitive
Analysis and Market Power of China’s Soybean Import Market.”
International Food and Agribusiness Management Review
12(1):21–42.
Yamaura, K. 2011. “Market Power of the Japanese Non-GM Soybean
Import Market: The U.S. Exporters Vs. Japanese Importers.”
Asian Journal of Agriculture and Rural Development 1(2):
80–89.
Yamaura, K. 2014. “Market Power of the Japanese Soybean Import
Market: GMO, Non-GMO, and Vertically Differentiated
Products.” Japanese Journal of Rural Economics Special
Issue (Nihon Nogyo Keizai Gakkai Ronbun-shu 2013) 16:
113–17.
Yang, S. R., and W. J. Lee. 2001. “Exporters’ Market Power in
Agricultural Import Markets in Korea.” In Paper presented at
the American Agricultural Economics Association annual
meeting, Chicago, IL, 5–8 August.
42 K. Yamaura and T. Xia: Measuring Bilateral Market Power in International Markets
Brought to you by | Kansas State University Libraries
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/4/17 12:20 AM
